Introduction
The simplest game is finite, two-person, zero-sum game. There are only two players, player I and player II, and it can be denoted by a matrix. Thus, such a game is called matrix game. Matrix games have many useful applications, especially in decision-making systems. In usual matrix game theory, all the entries of the payoff matrix are assumed to be exactly given. However, in real-world applications, we often encounter the case where the information on the required data includes imprecision or uncertainty because of uncertain environment. Hence, outcomes of a matrix game may not be a fixed number even though the players do not change their strategies. Therefore, interval-valued matrix, whose entries are closed intervals, is proposed by many researchers to model this kind of uncertainty see 1-6 . The solution methods of interval matrix games are studied by many authors. Most of solution techniques are based on linear programming methods for interval numbers see 1, 2, 5, 6 . We present, in this paper, a simplistic graphical method for solving 2 × n or m × 2 interval matrix games and provide a numerical example to exemplify the obtained algorithm.
2
Abstract and Applied Analysis
Interval Numbers
An extensive research and wide coverage on interval arithmetic and its applications can be found in 7 . Here, we only define interval numbers and some necessary operations on interval numbers. An interval number is a subset of real line of the form a a − , a x ∈ R : a − ≤ x ≤ a , 1
where a − , a ∈ R and a − ≤ a . If a − a , then a a, a is a real number. Mid-point m a and radius r a of interval number a is defined as
respectively. Elementary arithmetic operation ∈ { , −, ×, ÷} between two interval numbers a and b is given by a b {a b : a ∈ a, b ∈ b}.
1.3
For division operator, it is assumed that 0 / ∈ b. For any scalar number α, αa is defined as
αa , αa − , for α < 0. 1.4
Comparison of Interval Numbers
To compare strategies and payoffs for an interval matrix game, we need a notion of an interval ordering relation that corresponds to the intuitive notion of a better possible outcome or payoff. A brief comparison on different interval orders is given in 8, 9 on the basis of decision maker's opinion.
Disjoint Intervals
Let a a − , a and b b − , b be two disjoint interval numbers. Then, it is not difficult to define transitive order relation over these intervals, as a is strictly less than b if and only if a < b − . This is denoted by a < b, and it is an extension of "<" on the real line.
Nested Intervals
Let a a − , a and b b − , b be two interval numbers such that a
Here, the set inclusion only describes the condition that b is nested in a, but it cannot order a and b in terms of value.
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Let a and b be two cost intervals, and the minimum cost interval is to be chosen.
i If the decision maker DM is optimistic, then he/she will prefer the interval with maximum width along with the risk of more uncertainty giving less importance.
ii If DM is pessimistic, then he/she will pay more attention on more uncertainty. That is, on the right hand points of the intervals, and he/she will choose the interval with minimum width.
The case will be reverse when a and b represent profit intervals. Therefore, we can define the ranking order of a and b as
b, if the DM is pessimistic.
1.5
Here, the notation " " denotes the maximum among the interval numbers a and b. Similarly, we can write
a, if the DM is pessimistic.
1.6
Likewise, the notation " " denotes the minimum among the interval numbers a and b.
Partially Overlapping Intervals
The above-mentioned order relations cannot explain ranking between two overlapping closed intervals. Here, we use the acceptability index idea suggested by 8, 10 . This comparison method is mainly based on the mid-points of the intervals.
Let IR be the set of all interval numbers. The function Profit intervals DM will prefer the interval a instead of b, because DM will pay more attention on the highest possible profit of 18 unit ignoring the risk of minimum profit of 2 unit.
DM will prefer the interval b, because his/her attention will be drawn to the fact that the minimum profit of 5 unit will never be decreased.
Cost intervals DM will pay more attention on the minimum cost of 2 unit, that is, the left hand points both of the cost intervals a and b, and select a instead of b.
DM will again prefer the interval b, because DM will pay more attention on the maximum cost of 15 unit will never be increased.
Let a and b be two cost intervals, and minimum cost interval is to be chosen. If the DM is optimistic, then he/she will prefer the interval with maximum width along with the risk of more uncertainty giving less importance. Similarly, if the DM is pessimistic, then he/she will pay more attention on more uncertainty, that is, on the right end points of the intervals, and will choose the interval with minimum width. The case will be reverse when a and b represent profit intervals.
Example 1.1. Let a −5, −3 and b 2, 6 be two intervals. Then,
Thus, the DM accept the decision that a is less than b with full satisfaction. 
Hence, the DM accept the decision that a is less than b with grade of satisfaction 0.3. These can be written explicitly as 
1.11
Here, the notation a b represents the minimum of the interval numbers a and b.
Proposition 1.4. The interval ordering by the acceptability index defines a partial order relation on IR.
Proof. i If A a ≺ b 0 and r a r b , then a ≡ b, and we say that a and b are noninferior to each other. Hence, it is reflexive.
ii For any interval number a and b, A a ≺ b > 0, and A b ≺ a > 0 implies a b. Therefore, A is antisymmetric.
iii For any interval numbers a, b, c ∈ IR if
Thus, A is transitive.
On the other hand, acceptability index must not interpreted as difference operator of real analysis. Indeed, while A a ≺ b ≥ 0 and A b ≺ c ≥ 0, the inequality
For any two interval numbers a and
Also, A a ≺ b < 0 can be interpreted as the interval number b is inferior to the interval number a, since A b ≺ a > 0.
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Additionally, for any interval numbers a, b, c, and d, the following properties of acceptability index is obvious.
1.17
Matrix Games
Game theory is a mathematical discipline which studies situations of competition and cooperation between several involved parties, and it has many applications in broad areas such as strategic warfares, economic or social problems, animal behaviours, political voting systems. It is accepted that game theory starts with the von Neumann's study on zero-sum games see 11 , in which he proved the famous minimax theorem for zero-sum games. It was also basis for 12 .
The simplest game is finite, two-person, zero-sum game. There are only two players, player I and player II, and it can be denoted by a matrix. Thus, such a game is called matrix game. More formally, a matrix game is an m × n matrix G of real numbers.
A mixed strategy of player I is a probability distribution x over the rows of G, that is, an element of the set
Similarly, a strategy of player II is a probability distribution y over the columns of G, that is, an element of the set
A strategy x of player I is called pure if it does not involve probability, that is, x i 1 for some i 1, . . . , m, and it is denoted by I i . Similarly, pure strategies of player II is denoted by II j for j 1 for all y ∈ Y n . Therefore, a maximin strategy of player I maximizes the minimal payoff of player I, and a minimax strategy of player II minimizes the maximum that player II has to pay to player I.
Neumann proved that for every matrix game G, there is a real number ν with the following properties.
1 A strategy x of player I guarantees a payoff of at least ν to player I i.e., x T Gy ≥ ν for all strategies y of player II if and only if x is a maximin strategy.
2 A strategy y of player II guarantees a payment of at most ν by player II to player I i.e., x T Gy ≤ ν for all strategies x of player I if and only if y is a minimax strategy.
Hence, player I can obtain a payoff at least ν by playing maximin strategy, and player II can guarantee to pay not more than ν by playing minimax strategy. For these reasons, the number ν is also called the value of the game G. A position i, j is called saddle point if g ij ≥ g kj for all k 1, . . . , m and g ij ≤ g il for all l 1, . . . , n, that is, if g ij is maximal in its column j and minimal in its row i. Evidently, if i, j is a saddle point, then g ij must be the value of the game.
Interval Matrix Games
Interval matrix game is the interval generation of classical matrix games, and it is the special case of fuzzy games.
Here, we consider a nonzero sum interval matrix game with two players, and we assume that player I is maximizing or optimistic player and player II is minimizing or pessimistic player. We assume that player I will try to make maximum profit and player II will try to minimize the loss.
The two person interval matrix game is defined by m × n matrix G whose entries are interval numbers.
Let G be an interval matrix game
. . . to be lower and upper value of interval matrix game. then value of these matrix games are −3 and 7, respectively. Hence, there is no trivial relation between the value of interval matrix game and the value of endpoint matrix games.
It is naturally clear that
A ν L ≺ ν U ≥ 0. In addition, if ν L ν U ν,
A Graphical Method for Solving Interval Matrix Games
. . .
. . . . . .
be an interval matrix game. Let ν be value of m × n interval matrix game G. In general, the width of ν can vary. To normalize the width of ν in order to investigate a method for solving such games, from now on, we will assume that all entries of G are of same length; that is, g ij g − ij λ for some λ > 0 and i 1, 2, . . . , m, j 1, 2, . . . , n.
The solution methods of interval matrix games are studied by many authors. Most of solution techniques are based on linear programming methods for interval numbers see 1-4, 6 . A useful idea in solving 2 × n interval matrix games is that of worthwhile strategies. A worthwhile strategy is a pure strategy which appears with positive probability in an optimal strategy.
The following proposition is the important property about such strategies.
Proposition 2.1. When a worthwhile strategy plays an optimal strategy, the payoff is the value of the game.
It means that if x * , y * , ν ∈ X m × Y n × IR is the solution of interval matrix game 2.1 and the pure strategies I i * and II j * are worthwhile strategies, then the equalities
hold.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that player I has an optimal strategy x *
We also assume that player II has an optimal strategy y * and value of the game is ν. Hence, g x * , y * ν. Furthermore, for any pure strategy I i 1 ≤ i ≤ k of player I, we have
since player II playing optimal strategy y * . We set g I i , y * ν i . Then, using following equality:
and 2.4 we find
Thus, acceptability index must be 0, and so ν i ν for all i 1, 2, . . . , k. Therefore, playing the worthwhile strategy I i against optimal strategy y * gives a payoff that is the value of the game.
The proof of 2.3 is similar. 
A g x, y * ≺ ν ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X m .
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Since II j ∈ Y n for all j 1, 2, . . . , n, then using 2.10 , we get
for all j 1, 2, . . . , n. Therefore, it follows that
Using 2.13 , we find 
2.20
Therefore, we have
for all y ∈ Y n . Since A ν ≺ ν * > 0, we get from 2.11 that
for all x ∈ X m . Using 1.28 , 2.21 , and 2.22 , we conclude that x, y * , ν * is also a solution of 2.1 , contradicting the fact that value of the game is unique. This concludes that 2.15 holds. Hence, from 2.9 and 2.15 , we obtain the validity of 2.7 .
By completely analogous arguments, we can also obtain 2.8 . Now, using Theorem 2.2, we can show how to solve interval matrix games, where at least one of the players has two pure strategies.
Let us consider
2 × n interval matrix game. We denote the value of G by the symbol ν * .
Since player I has only two strategies, for any x x 1 , x 2 ∈ X 2 , we can write x t, 1 − t , t ∈ 0, 1 . Then, we obtain
for t ∈ 0, 1 . Setting
we get
Using Theorem 2.2, we have
Therefore, the following algorithm can be used to find solution of 2 × n interval matrix games.
Algorithm 2.3.
Step 1. Plot φ j : 0, 1 → IR for all j 1, . . . , n on the plane.
Step 2. Draw the function ψ : 0, 1 → IR by setting ψ t j 1,...,n φ j t , 2.28 see Figure 1 .
Step 3. By means of definition of ψ calculate the {ψ t } on 0, 1 ; that is, find
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Step 4. Using definition of ψ, calculate the t * ∈ 0, 1 , where ψ attains its maximum. Thus, x * t * , 1 − t * , and the optimal strategy of player I is obtained.
Step 5. Using the property of worthwhile strategies, find the optimal strategy of player II.
To see how this works, let us solve a game. In this game, no player has a dominant strategy; that is, there is no strategy which is always better than any other strategy, for any profile of other players' actions. Additionally, since If player I's optimal strategy is x t, 1 − t , t ∈ 0, 1 , then for j 1, 2, . . . , 5, we get φ j t g x, II j tg 1j 1 − t g 2j .
Numerical Example

3.3
Hence, 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have adapted graphical method for matrix games to interval matrix games by means of acceptability index notion. It is showed that by means of this method, solution of 2 × n or m × 2 interval matrix games can be easily calculated. Since the method can be easily programmed, it is very useful for interval matrix games even though players have at most two pure strategies after domination.
